Buffalo Law Review
Volume 10

Number 1

Article 20

10-1-1960

Civil Procedure—Libel: Sufficiency of Complaint
Buffalo Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Buffalo Law Review, Civil Procedure—Libel: Sufficiency of Complaint, 10 Buff. L. Rev. 83 (1960).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol10/iss1/20

This The Court of Appeals Term is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
and actionable; the duty does not have to be a legal one but only a moral or
sound duty of imperfect obligation.56
It is qualified because it doesn't extend beyond such statements as the
writer makes in the performance of such duty and in good faith believing them
57
to be true.
The defendant moved for summary judgment pleading this privilege and
the plaintiff filed answering affidavits charging the defendants with malice and a
desire to injure him in his profession. This rebuttal, in its attempt to lift the
protective panelopy of the defendants, is founded upon certain alleged past
disagreements between the parties over policy matters, mistatement by the
defendants of the facts surrounding the plaintiff's dismissal from hospital staffs
and lack of fairness in the administrative proceeding leading up to his removal
from his medical group. He leveled charges of conspiracy and "a plot to get
him" against the defendant officers and the plaintiff's insurer in an attempt to
show that actual malice had destroyed the immunity of qualified privilege.
The trial court,6 with the Appellate Division affirming, 59 denied the
motion for summary judgment, stating that they could not hold as a matter of
law that the answering affidavits had failed to present evidentiary facts sufficient
to raise an inference of malice. Rule 113 of the Civil Practice Act requires
that a motion for summary judgment be granted unless the answering affidavits
show evidentiary facts sufficient to establish the existence of a triable issue.p
The Court of Appeals reversed and granted the motion. It ruled that the
plaintiff had not met the burden of overcoming the presumption of privilege.
They looked upon the fact recitation in the answering affidavits as being devoid
of specific content and refused to accept conclusary allegations of malice as a
substitute for the statutory requisite of a jury issue. The opinion indicates
that "mere suspicion, surmise and accusations", characteristic of the instant
case, suggesting a conspiracy to injure the plaintiff, are not sufficiently germane
unless substantiated by particular facts setting forth a triable issue as to malice
and bad faith.
LIBEL: SUFFICENCY OF COMPLAINT

In Drug Research Corporation v. Curtis Publishing Company,. ' a libel
action, plaintiff sought general damages for an article which appeared in the
56. Supra note 53, at 150, 19 N.E. 75 (1888).
57. More than a mere scintilla of evidence is required to overcome the qualified
privilege. Ashcroft v. Hammond, 197 N.Y. 488, 90 N.E. 524 (1910); Hemmens v. Nelson,
138 N.Y. 517, 34 N.E. 424 (1893).
58. 12 Misc. 2d 1051, 173 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
59. 7 A.D.2d 733, 180 N.Y.S.2d 573 (2d Dep't 1958).
60. New York Rules Civ. Prac., Rule 113 § 2:
The motion shall be granted if upon all the papers and proof submitted the action
or claim or defense shall be established sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter
of law in directing judgment .. .in favor of any party. (It) . . . shall be denied
if any party shall show facts sufficient to require a trial of any issue of fact ...
other than the extent of damages.) ...
61. 7 N.Y.2d 435, 199 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1960).
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Saturday Evening Post entitled, "Don't Fall For The Mail Frauds". The article
described some of the mail-fraud schemes prevalent today and made particular
reference to the product "Regimen", a weight reducing pill, and one of its distributors-The Wonder Drug Corporation.
The complaint stated that the article was libelous to both the product
Regimen and plaintiff, Drug Research Corporation, who is both a distributor
and the manufacturer of Regimen.
In the complaint, plaintiff set out the article in full, alleged the loss of
customers and the refusal of various advertising agencies to carry plaintiff's
advertising, and demanded damages in the sum of $5,000,000. No special
damages were pleaded.
The Supreme Court denied defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficiency
and the Appellate Division affirmed.0 2 The Court of Appeals reversed dis63
missing the complaint.
It has been the law of New York since Tobias v. Harland 4 that when the
words are spoken of the product and not of the manufacturer, the plaintiff must
plead and prove special damages-unless the words impute to the manufacturer
deceit or malpractice in manufacturing or selling his product. If the loss of
customers is claimed, they must be named. If persons have refused to purchase,
65
they too must be named.
In Marlin Fire Arms Company v. Shields,"6 the publisher of a magazine
printed allegedly libelous letters about the Marlin Rifle. The Marlin Company
sought equitable relief in the form of an injunction to restrain defendant from
printing any more articles concerning plaintiff's rifles. Plaintiff contended that
they had no adequate remedy at law because it was impossible to compute
mathematically their damages. The Court refused the request, holding, inter
alia, that plaintiff's remedy was at law where they had to plead and prove
7
special damages. In Stillman v. Paramount Pictures Corporation,"
defendant
produced a fictional motion picture in which one of the characters uttered
words to the effect that he could go to Stillman's Gym and get a punch-drunk
fighter. The Court held that since the reference was to Stillman's Gym and
not to plaintiff personally, special damages had to be pleaded and proved.
The Court dismissed plaintiff's complaint here because plaintiff was not
mentioned with particularity in the article. On its face, the article concerned
the product Regimen and the nefarious activities of the Wonder Drug Corporation. Nowhere was plaintiff specifically referred to in the article. The Court
ruled that libelous language must be tested by a fair and not a broad reading
62. 7 A.D.2d 285, 182 N.YS.2d 412 (1st Dep't 1959).
63. Supra note 61.
64. 4 Wend. 537 (1830).
65. Reporters' Ass'n v. Sun Printing and Publishing Company, 186 N.Y. 437, 79
N.E. 710 (1906).
66. 171 N.Y. 384, 64 N.E. 163 (1902).
67. 2 A.J2d 18, 153 N.YS.2d 190 (1st Dep't 1956).
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of the text and to rule that plaintiff was referred to with any specificity in the
article would be quite inconsistent with a fair reading.
In any libel action, the principle of free speech and expression of opinion
is always present in the court's mind and the courts will be very hesitant about
ruling in any manner that might infringe or impose upon this principle. This
statement is especially true and should always be borne carefully in mind when
the area of critical business opinions is approached.
The dissent argued that if this pill does not reduce weight at all as the
article says, then no manufacturer could have produced it without intending
that it be sold under false pretenses. Therefore, the complaint alleges a liber
against plaintiff as well as against its product.
At first blush, this argument appears convincing if you accept the major
premise as true-for the manufacturer could very well have been honestly
mistaken.
A closer examination of this argument, however, reveals that the effect
of ruling this way would be to overrule the rule of special damages completely
and allow any manufacturer to plead general damages in an action for libel
on his product. Who couldn't argue, in this light, that if any article produced
by a manufacturer does not perform the function that he implies it will, then
the manufacturer could not possibly have produced it without intending that
it be sold under false pretenses.
The Court of Appeals in dismissing plaintiff's complaint indicates very
clearly that they intend to hold the line exactly where it is, i.e. that of requiring
special damages to pleaded and proved where plaintiff's product and not his
reputation or integrity is attacked.
SUMMAY JuDGMMNT REQunhEs ABSENCE OF TRLABLE IssuE OF FACT

A motion for summary judgment in New York may be made by either
party after issue is joined, 8 and must be supported by affidavits and other
available proof. 69 If the claim or defense is established sufficiently to warrant
the court as a matter of law in directing judgment the motion will be granted. 70
7
"Issue-finding rather than issue-determination is the key to the procedure," '
however, and the motion will be granted only when it is clear that no triable
issue of fact is presented. 72 If there is any doubt as to the existence of such
issue73 or if the issue is arguable, 4 the motion should be denied. The motion
may not be defeated by surmise, conjecture or suspicion, 75 however, and if the
68. N.Y. Rules Civ. Prac., Rule 113(1).
69. N.Y. Rules Civ. Prac., Rule 113(2).
70. Ibid.
71. Esteve v. Abad, 271 App. Div. 725, 727, 68 N.Y.S.2d 322, -324 (1st Dep't 1947).
72. Di Menna & Sons v. City of New York, 301 N.Y. 118, 92 N.E.2d 918 (1950).
73. Braun v. Carey, 280 App. Div. 1019, 116 N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dep't 1952).
74. Barrett v. Jacobs, 255 N.Y. 520, 175 N.E. 275 (1931).
75. Bank for Savings in City of New York v. Rellim Const. Co., 285 N.Y. 708, 34
N.E.2d 485 (1941).
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issue is not genuine but feigned, in truth there being nothing to try, the motion
is properly granted. 76
In Falk v. Goodman,77 a suit to recover monies deposited in escrow based
on an escape clause voiding a contract for the sale of a dwelling if the purchaser was unsuccessful in obtaining a mortgage, the defendant raised an
affirmative defense of fraud in the execution of the contract. He alleged that
the plaintiffs wilfully understated their income in their mortgage applications
in order to activate the escape clause and thus circumvent their contractual
obligation. His affidavit, in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, alleged that when he advised plaintiffs in the course of their preliminary
negotiations that in order to obtain the intended mortgage it would be necessary
to prove a weekly income of $200, plaintiff replied, "Well, we don't have a thing
to worry about. I can show easily that I earn more than that." In the mortgage
application plaintiffs stated their weekly income to be only $102.
On the theory that this evidence would be barred by the parol evidence
rule, the trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment 7s and
the Appellate Division affirmed.7" The Court of Appeals reversed holding that
inasmuch as the issue was not one of fraud in the making of the contract but
rather of fraud in its execution, the parol evidence rule did not apply. Moreover, the bad faith pleaded charged a wilful non-performance of a condition
subsequent which, if established, would defeat the plaintiffs' right to recover
their deposit. Without considering whether this defense could be established
at the trial, the Court determined that the allegationsgave rise to a triable issue
of fact.
In a strong dissent, Judge Desmond looked beyond the bare allegations,
considering also the evidentiary matter submitted in opposition to the motion.
He argued that even if the sole evidence advanced in support of the defendant's
allegations, the plaintiff's alleged pre-contract remark, was established at the
trial it still would fail to make a jury question of the alleged wilful nonperformance of the contract. Therefore, he deemed the motion for summary judgment
properly granted, albeit on erroneous grounds.
The summary judgment procedure was adopted in order to expedite adjudication of civil cases by enabling the court to summarily determine whether
or not a bona fide issue exists between the parties.80 While the court may not
usurp the function of a jury, it has been well established that it may look beyond an apparent triable issue presented by the pleadings in deciding whether
76. Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 113 N.E.2d 424 (1953).
77. 7 N.Y.2d 87, 195 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1959).
78. 14 Misc. 2d 964, 178 N.Y.S.2d 471 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
79. 7 A.D2d 1014, 185 N.Y.S.2d 231 (2d Dep't 1959).
80. General Inv. Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 235 N.Y. 133, 139 N.E.
216 (1923).
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or not there is a real issue for the jury.8s Falk v. Goodman s 2 seems to indicate
a departure from this practice which is unfortunate, for if the purpose of the
summary judgment procedure is to be fully realized, clearly the court must
require more from litigants than mere allegations of a triable issue of fact.
(1.) In any action, after issue has been joined, any party may
move for summary judgment . . . (2.) . . . the motion shall be
granted if upon all the papers and proof submitted, the action or claim
or defense shall be established sufficiently to warrant the court as a
matter of law in directing judgement ... in favor of any party. The
motion shall be denied if any party shall show facts sufficient to require a trial of any issu6 of fact other than an issue as to the amount
.. . of the damages . . .8
In Stone v. Goodson,8 4 plaintiff moved for summary judgment against
defendant on an alleged breach of contract. Plaintiff claimed that defendant
had used plaintiff's literary materials in the production of defendant's program
Trm PRIcE Is RIGHT without paying plaintiff the royalties agreed to in the contract of sale.
The facts of the case as they were set out in the opinion were as follows:
On December 7, 1953, plaintiff submitted to defendant a proposed television
series which he titled THE PRicE Is RiGHT. On January 29, 1954, plaintiff sold
all of his rights in the materials to defendant in return for defendant's promise
to pay plaintiff royalties on the materials if defendant used them. On November 1, 1956, plaintiff and defendant entered into another agreement whereby
plaintiff sold the title THE PRICE Is RiGHT to defendant for $1,000. This contract also incorporated the terms of the January 29, 1954 agreement whereby
defendant promised to pay certain royalties if he used the literary material that
plaintiff had previously submitted to him.
About one month after the November 1, 1956 agreement, defendant
broadcast the program TBE PRICE Is RIGHT which plaintiff claims was a use of
the materials he submitted to defendant.
Upon defendant's refusal to pay, the royalties that plaintiff contended
were due him, plaintiff brought an action in the Supreme Court for breach of
contract. The Supreme Court had before it the materials that plaintiff had
submitted to the defendant and the format' for defendant's show. Plaintiff
moved for summary judgment contending that all the evidence was before
the court and the court should decide whether defendant's program was a use
of plaintiff's materials.8 5 Plaintiff argued that there was a substantial similarity
between the two programs-the most significant of which was the use of the
81.
Ibid.; Shapiro v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater N.Y., 7 N.Y.2d 56, 194 N.Y.S.2d 509
(1959); Sprung v. Jaffe, 3 N.Y.2d 539, 169 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1957); Rubin v. Irving Trust
Co., supra note 76.
82. Supra note 70.
83. N.Y. Rules of Civ. Prac., Rule 113.
84. 8 N.Y.2d 8, 200 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1960).
85. Park v. Warner Brothers, 8 F. Supp. 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); Weitzenkorn v.
Lesser, 40 Cal. 2d 778, 256 P.2d 947 (1953).
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retail price of merchandise as the central theme. Plaintiff also set forth defendant's admission that this was the first quiz program defendant had ever produced that used retail price as its central theme.
The Supreme Court granted plaintiff's motion,80 and the Appellate Division
reversed."s The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division, holding that
an arguable issue of fact had been raised by defendant's answer.
The substance of plaintiff's submission is as follows: A sole participant
selects an item from a group of articles displayed at retail price. The master
of ceremonies then asks four questions and each time a correct answer is given,
the price is automatically reduced to half. For example, if the four questions
are answered correctly, a $200 item is reduced to $12.50. The participant may
purchase the article at any stage of the questioning, and the money received is,
at the show's conclusion, donated to a charity. This procedure is repeated with
two subsequent contestants. The fourth contestant is a representative of a
charitable organization. He too, is asked four questions, but instead of receiving merchandise at a reduced price, a special jackpot is multiplied by two each
time a correct answer is given.
On defendant's program, an article of merchandise, the retail price of
which is not revealed, is exhibited to a panel of four contestants, who, in an
effort to estimate the price, proceed to bid for the item. At the conclusion of
the bidding, the retail price is then made known. The article is then given to
the contestant who comes the closest to the retail price without exceeding it.
This procedure is then repeated with another article of merchandise until the
conclusion of the show. Then, the contestant who has accumulated the most
(dollar wise) is invited to participate on the next program. An added attraction for the benefit of the home viewing audience is the "Showcase" contest
where a multitude of articles are displayed. The person who then mails in a
card stating the total retail price of all the items displayed, without exceeding
it, receives all the merchandise without charge.
Defendant, an alleged expert on programs of this type, had averred that
there was no substantial similarity between the plaintiff's and defendant's programs. In addition, defendant submitted an affidavit by the alleged originator
of defendant's program which stated that he had written the program that
defendant had based THE PRICE Is RIGHT upon.
It is well established, the Court of Appeals ruled, that if the issue is fairly
debatable, a motion for summary judgment must be denied.8 8 To grant summary judgment, it must clearly appear that no material and triable issue of
fact is presented.8 9
86. 17 Misc. 2d 652, 188 N.Y.S.2d 660 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
87. 9 A.D.2d 646, 191 N.Y.S.2d 394 (1st Dep't 1959).
88. Falk v. Goodman, 7 N.Y.2d 87, 195 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1959); Sillman v. Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 395, 165 N.Y.S.2d 498 (1952).
89. DiMenna and Sons v. City of New York, 301 N.Y. 118, 92 N.E.2d 918 (1950);
Braun v. Carey, 280 App. Div. 1019, 116 N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dep't 1952).
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The issue that was raised by defendant's answer, the Court thought, was
that of user, i.e. whether defendant had actually based his program upon the
materials that plaintiff had submitted to him. However, the Court went on
to say that it was of the opinion that plaintiff's theme was substantially lifted
by defendant in the production of his show.
The reasoning of the Court in determining that there is an arguable issue
of fact here is difficult to follow. The Court admits that, in their opinion, defendant had pirated plaintiff's central theme, yet they say that an arguable issue
of user exists, i.e. whether defendant had actually based his program upon the
plaintiff's format. They also say that no plagiarist can excuse himself by showing. how much of plaintiff's work that he did not pirate, and still they conclude
with the determination that an arguable issue of fact exists.
Perhaps what the Court really was interested in was getting more expert
testimony from literary experts. Possibly they felt that the question of substantial similarity in cases involving literary materials can best be disposed of
with the aid of unbiased experts at a trial.
At the same time, however, Rule 113's specific purpose is to allow the courts
to lighten their calendars by summarily disposing of cases where reasonable men
could not differ in arriving at a verdict. In order for the trial courts to grant
these motions, however, they have to know exactly what criteria to use but
this decision does not clearly point out when a motion for summary judgment
is in order.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ADmISSIBILTY or CONFESSIONS OBTAINED AFTER INDICTMENT

The Court of Appeals, by a recent decision, People v. Di Biasi,' has placed
New York in the advanced guard among states in the protection of the right
to counsel of persons accused of crimes. The position taken by Chief judge
Desmond in his dissenting opinion in Pbople v. Spano2 is now the law in New
York State.
In the Di Biasi case, defendant was indicted in 1952 for first degree
murder. But it was not until 1958 that defendant surrendered to the police,
by arrangement with his attorney, to plead to the indictment. The defendant
was questioned by the Assistant District Attorney and several officers in the
District Attorney's office for an unspecified time and made certain statements
to these officials which were admitted in evidence at his trial. These admissions
were to the effect that he knew the deceased victim, was a partner of the
deceased in a night club, and that he knew certain persons either involved in
or witnesses to the murder. Defendant also stated that he was drunk when he
1. 7 N.Y.2d 544, 200 N.YS.2d 21 (1960).
2. 4 N.Y.2d 256, 173 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1958), rev'd infra note 3.
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